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Abstract 
 In the natural world, stimulus-outcome associations are often noisy and ambiguous. Learning to 
disambiguate these associations to identify which specific outcomes will occur is critical for survival. 
Pavlovian occasion setters are stimuli that determine whether other stimuli that are ambiguous will result 
in a specific outcome. Occasion setting is a well-established field, but very little investigation has been 
conducted on how occasion setters are disambiguated when they themselves are ambiguous. We 
investigated the role of higher-order Pavlovian occasion setting in humans. We also developed and tested 
the first computational model predicting direct associations, traditional occasion setting, and 2nd-order 
occasion setting. Results showed that occasion setters affected ambiguous but not unambiguous lower-order 
stimuli and that 2nd-order occasion setting was indeed learned. Our computational model demonstrated 
excellent fit with the data, advancing our theoretical understanding of learning with ambiguity. These 
results may ultimately improve treatment of Pavlovian-based mental health disorders (e.g., anxiety).  
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Survival requires the organism to quickly learn which situations predict safety vs danger and reward 
vs no reward. This is straightforward to accomplish when a given situation consistently predicts a specific 
outcome (e.g., 1). However, when the situation predicts more than one outcome (and is therefore 
ambiguous), it can be difficult to determine which outcome will occur, which may have survival 
consequences. The most prominent experimental paradigm for learning stimulus-outcome associations is 
Pavlovian conditioning, in which the organism learns associations between conditional stimuli (CSs) and 
their outcomes (i.e., unconditional stimuli; USs). The CS+ is a CS that is paired with the US, whereas the 
CS- is paired with the absence of the US. These tend to be unambiguous stimuli – meaning, they always 
(or almost always) predict their respective outcomes. However, in the real world, it is rare for a stimulus to 
be truly unambiguous. Rather, stimuli tend to be ambiguous since they sometimes predict one outcome and 
other times predict other outcomes depending on the situation. In order to optimize survival, the organism 
must learn to disambiguate these stimuli/situations and predict their outcomes accurately. 
For example, perhaps a specific child usually behaves well, but the parent is interested in figuring 
out which situations lead to bad behavior from the child. Because the child often behaves well but 
sometimes behaves badly, there is an ambiguous association between the child and bad behavior. From a 
Pavlovian perspective, the parent needs to learn which stimuli, situational factors, or contexts determine 
whether the child (CS) will behave badly (US). One of the primary Pavlovian experimental designs 
investigating ambiguous CSs is occasion setting (2–9), in which an occasion setter is a stimulus that indicates 
whether the CS will result in the US. In this case, perhaps the child has a friend that is a bad influence, and 
when the child sees this friend in the afternoon, the child behaves badly later that night. Theoretically, the 
friend (occasion setter) would enable the child/bad behavior (CS/US) association, but the absence of the 
friend would enable the child/good behavior (CS/No US) association. Indeed, occasion setters can either 
enable or disable the CS/US association. Those that enable it are called positive occasion setters (i.e., the 
CS predicts the US only if the positive occasion setter was presented), and those that disable it are negative 
occasion setters (i.e., the CS predicts the US unless the negative occasion setter was presented). 
Occasion setting is thought to operate via modulation (2,9), where the occasion setter directly affects 
the CS/US association (other theories, such as configuration, show considerable accuracy, though less than 
modulation; 9). The modulation account posits that stimuli are arranged hierarchically in meaning, where 
higher-order learning (i.e., occasion setting) affects lower-order learning (i.e., direct associations: learning 
that a CS directly predicts the presence or absence of the US). Multiple tests can be performed to discern 
whether occasion setting was indeed learned, as opposed to other explanations (e.g., that the “occasion 
setter” simply formed a direct association with the US; 10). First, a stimulus can simultaneously possess 
both direct and occasion setting values (2,3,11,12) – meaning, it can be a CS- (directly inhibiting the US 
memory) and a positive occasion setter (enabling the CS/US association of a different CS). Using the 
example above, the friend could directly inhibit bad behavior for themselves but enable bad behavior from 
the other child. Second, an occasion setter will only influence CSs that have undergone training with an 
occasion setter (11–17). This means that occasion setters will only affect responding to ambiguous CSs, 
though some specificity is involved (e.g., 11–13,16). These two properties can be tested with a combination of 
training and transfer test procedures, as are done in the present experiments. 
Many studies have been conducted on traditional occasion setting described above (2,3,9; hereafter 
referred to as 1st-order occasion setting), but there is very limited research on 2nd-order occasion setting, 
including studies investigating it directly (18) or indirectly (13,19–21). We define second-order occasion setters 
as stimuli that determine how ambiguous 1st-order occasion setters will affect the CS/US association. Using 
our example from above, the child (CS) ordinarily does not behave badly (US) unless they see their friend 
(1st-order occasion setter). Converting this to a 2nd-order occasion setting example, perhaps the friend only 
sometimes makes the child behave badly, making the friend an ambiguous 1st-order occasion setter. A 2nd-
order occasion setter would determine whether the friend (1st-order occasion setter) will cause the child 
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(CS) to behave badly (US). Perhaps the child’s grandparent (2nd-order occasion setter) gives the child good 
advice regarding the friend that protects the child from the friend’s bad influence. Thus, if the child (CS) 
sees the grandparent in the morning, the child will not behave badly (US) that night – even if they see their 
friend (1st-order occasion setter) in the afternoon. A major goal of the present manuscript is to determine 
whether humans use 2nd-order occasion setting to resolve ambiguity in stimulus-outcome relationships. We 
are aware of only one study (using rats) that explicitly attempted to investigate whether 2nd-order occasion 
setting can be learned (18). While they successfully trained discriminations that resemble 2nd-order occasion 
setting, they did not conduct the transfer tests that are necessary to conclude that the underlying learning 
was indeed 2nd-order occasion setting. 
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Thus, while 2nd-order occasion setting is a theoretically plausible learning process, there are no 
experiments demonstrating it, as the only study attempting to do so (18) did not administer the appropriate 
tests to determine whether 2nd-order occasion setting was indeed learned. Additionally, there have been no 
formal models that predict 2nd-order occasion setting – perhaps because 2nd-order occasion setting has not 
been explicitly demonstrated. In the present manuscript, we have formalized and tested such a model (see 
Methods and Supplementary Materials) based upon the idea of hierarchical modulation of associative 
representations (Figure 1). In our model, lower-level stimulus ambiguity causes learning to hierarchically 
ascend from a) direct associations to 1st-order occasion setting, and b) 1st-order occasion setting to 2nd-order 
occasion setting. In other words, if a lower-level stimulus is ambiguous, then higher-order learning can 
occur. 
 There were three goals in the present experiments: 1) determine whether 2nd-order occasion setting 
can be learned, 2) determine whether learning higher-order Pavlovian associations is dependent on lower-
order stimulus ambiguity, and 3) evaluate our computational model of 2nd-order occasion setting. To this 
end, we conducted two mirror-image experiments: a 2nd-order negative occasion setting experiment 
(Experiment 1) and a 2nd-order positive occasion setting experiment (Experiment 2). To address the first 
goal, we trained multiple stimuli across discriminations intended to cause learning across three hierarchical 
levels: direct learning, 1st-order occasion setting, and 2nd-order occasion setting. We conducted specific 
tests (i.e., transfer tests) to test whether 1st-order and 2nd-order occasion setting were indeed learned. We 
predicted that each hierarchical level would be orthogonal – meaning, a stimulus could simultaneously 
signal outcomes in each of the three levels (e.g., Stimulus A: CS+, 1st-order positive occasion setter, 2nd-
order negative occasion setter). We also tested whether a 2nd-order occasion setter could affect a CS without 
the presence of a 1st-order occasion setter, predicting that it could not (i.e., a 2nd-order occasion setter cannot 
bypass a 1st-order occasion setter to affect a CS directly). To address the second goal, we predicted all 
occasion setters would not affect responding to lower-order stimuli if they were unambiguous. Conversely, 
we predicted 2nd-order occasion setters would affect responding to lower-order stimuli if they were 
ambiguous (e.g., 13,16,22). For a list of all specific hypotheses and analyses details, please see our pre-
registrations (Experiment 1: https://osf.io/n2c6v, Experiment 2: https://osf.io/hxcfs). To evaluate our third 
goal, we conducted computational modeling to evaluate model fit and accuracy using our novel 2nd-order 
occasion setting model and contrasted its predictions with our 1st-order occasion setting model and the 
Rescorla-Wagner model (10).  
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Results 
 For full statistical details of results reported below, see Supplemental Materials. 
 
Training 
 
Results from training phases are shown in Figure 3. The critical test of reinforcement learning was 
the Reminder phases, as this was the end of each training section. Overall, in both experiments, participants 
correctly learned which stimuli were reinforced and which were not for all trial types – direct associations, 
1st-order occasion setting, and 2nd-order occasion setting. The most important and novel of these was 2nd-
order occasion setting: as hypothesized, 2nd-order occasion setting trial types had significantly lower 
(Experiment 1) and greater (Experiment 2) responding than their respective 1st-order occasion setting trial 
types during Reminder (e.g., Experiment 1: ABC- vs BC+; Experiment 2: UMN+ vs MN-; ps < .001).  
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 and 2 Training Results. a, b, c) Experiment 1 Training results generally reflect 
direct CS/US associations, 1st-order positive occasion setting, and 2nd-order negative occasion setting. 
d, e, f) Experiment 2 Training results generally reflect direct CS/US associations, 1st-order negative 
occasion setting, and 2nd-order positive occasion setting. Congruent conditions/panels are displayed 
horizontally between experiments. Results in both experiments showed that participants correctly 
learned which stimuli were (non)reinforced. Error bands reflect standard error. Generally, “cool” 
colors (blues, greens, purples) indicate hypothesized higher values, whereas “warm” colors (reds, 
oranges, yellows) indicate hypothesized lower values. See Supplementary Materials for interactive 
graphs (i.e., html files), where the reader can hide/show conditions, see specific values of data, and 
zoom in/out. 
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Transfer Test 
 
 See Figure 4 and Supplementary Materials 
for details on statistical analyses. Overall, all our 
hypotheses were supported in Experiment 1, and 
most hypotheses were supported in Experiment 2. 
Replicating previous research, we 
hypothesized that a 1st-order occasion setter would 
not affect an unambiguous CS. This was tested three 
times in each experiment. In Experiment 1, all three 
1st-order positive occasion setting transfer tests 
were successful; in Experiment 2, one of three 1st-
order negative occasion setting tests was successful 
(constituting our only two null results across all 
hypotheses in both experiments). First, in 
Experiment 1, all three 1st-order occasion setting 
tests were successful, as evidenced by more similar 
responding between BH/H- than BH/BC+ (Figure 
4a; p < .001), JH/H- than JH/JK+ (Figure 4b; p < 
.001), and AH/H- than AH/G+ (Figure 4c; p < .001). 
Congruently, Experiment 2 showed that one of three 
1st-order negative occasion setting transfer tests was 
successful. Specifically, responding to EG was 
equidistant from EF and G+ (Figure 4f; p = .588), 
and responding to MG was equidistant from MN- 
and G+ (Figure 4g; p = .197). Conversely, our third 
test showed more similar responding between 
DG/G+ than DG/H- (Figure 4h; p < .001), 
supporting the hypothesis. See Discussion 
regarding null results. 
Second, as part of our novel hypotheses, we 
hypothesized that 2nd-order occasion setters could 
only affect a CS if a 1st-order occasion setter were 
present; thus, we tested 2nd-order occasion setters on 
CSs in absence of 1st-order occasion setters, 
predicting the 2nd-order occasion setter would not 
affect the CS. Results supported this hypothesis in 
both experiments. In Experiment 1, AG showed 
more similar responding to G+ than H- (Figure 4c; 
p < .001), and in Experiment 2, DH showed more 
similar responding to H- than G+ (Figure 4h; p < 
.001).  
Third, one of our critical novel tests was 
whether a 2nd-order occasion setter would affect 
unambiguous lower-order stimuli; we hypothesized 
it would not. This was assessed using a) the trained 
2nd-order occasion setter/1st-order occasion setter 
combination with an unambiguous CS, as well as 
testing b) the 2nd-order occasion setter with a trained 
unambiguous 1st-order occasion setter/CS 
combination. In each case and in both experiments, 
Figure 4. Experiment 1 and 2 Transfer Test Results. Panels a-f are from 
Experiment 1 (left column); panels g-j are from Experiment 2 (right 
column). Individual data points are plotted on using an empirical 
cumulative distribution function, where the X-axis indicates the 
fraction of observations ≤ the US expectancy value. The horizontal lines 
indicate the mean values of the trained (solid lines) and transfer 
(dotted lines) stimuli; shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals. 
"Cool" colors (blues, greens, purples) are hypothesized to have high 
values, whereas "warm" colors (reds, oranges, yellows) are 
hypothesized to have low values.  Stimuli with mixed colors are transfer 
stimuli. CS+ = excitatory conditional stimulus; CS- = inhibitory CS; POS1 
= 1st-order positive occasion setter; NOS1 = 1st-order negative occasion 
setter; POS2 = 2nd-order POS; NOS2 = 2nd-order NOS. Most relevant 
comparisons in panels e (AJK2 vs AJK1) and j (DMN2 vs DMN1) show 
transfer only occurred with ambiguous stimuli. See Supplementary 
Materials for interactive graphs (i.e., html files), where the reader can 
hide/show conditions, see specific values of data, and zoom in/out. 
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all hypotheses were supported. Specifically, in Experiment 1, AJK had more similar responding to JK+ 
than ABC- (Figure 4d; p = .005), and ABG had more similar responding to G+ than ABC- (p = .005). 
Congruently, in Experiment 2, DMN had more similar responding to MN- than DEF+ (Figure 4i; p = .002), 
and DEH had more similar responding to H- than DEF+ (p < .001). 
Fourth, our other critical novel test was to evaluate whether the ability of 2nd-order occasion setters 
to affect lower-order stimuli depended on whether the lower-order stimuli were unambiguous or 
ambiguous. In the previous paragraph, we demonstrated that 2nd-order occasion setters had little effect on 
unambiguous lower-order OS1/CS combinations. In each experiment, we later trained those same 
unambiguous 1st-order occasion setter/CS combinations with a 2nd-order occasion setter to make them 
ambiguous. We then tested whether a different 2nd-order occasion setter could affect the now-ambiguous 
1st-order occasion setter/CS combination more than it did before. Thus, the exact same stimulus 
combinations (i.e., Experiment 1: AJK; Experiment 2: DMN) were each tested twice – once when the 1st-
order occasion setter/CS combinations were unambiguous and later when ambiguous. We hypothesized 
there would be a greater effect of 2nd-order occasion setters on the 1st-order occasion setter/CS combinations 
if the latter were ambiguous. This hypothesis was supported in both experiments. In Experiment 1, 
responding was lower to ambiguous AJK (i.e., AJK2) than unambiguous AJK (i.e., AJK1; Figure 4e; p < 
.001). Congruently, in Experiment 2, responding was higher to ambiguous DMN (i.e., DMN2) than 
unambiguous DMN (i.e., DMN1; Figure 4j; p < .001). 
 
Computational modeling 
 
While the model-free results above demonstrate the presence of 2nd-order occasion setting, they do 
not allow us to evaluate the underlying theoretical process through which occasion setters affect 
expectations (e.g., via lower-order stimulus ambiguity) nor quantitatively evaluate competing theoretical 
models. To answer this question, we tested a computational model that allowed occasion setters to impact 
outcome expectations only if lower-order stimuli were ambiguous. That is, the influence of 1st-order 
occasion setters was dependent on CS ambiguity, and the influence of 2nd-order occasion setters was 
dependent on 1st-order occasion setter ambiguity and CS ambiguity. 
 
Parameter Recovery 
 
 For each model, we simulated random data and evaluated our 2nd- and 1st-order occasion setting 
models’ and the Rescorla-Wagner model’s ability to estimate those parameters accurately. In short, all 
models in both Experiments showed high correlations between simulated and recovered parameters (rs > 
.998; see Supplemental Materials), indicating that we were able to accurately estimate individual subjects’ 
parameter values.  
 
Model Fit  
 
 Results show that, in both experiments, all versions of our 1st- and 2nd-order occasion setting models 
– which allowed occasion setters to influence expectations of ambiguous CSs – accounted for a significant 
portion of the variance. They also outperformed the Rescorla-Wagner model (see Figure 5), which makes 
predictions based purely on direct associations without considering the modulatory effects of occasion 
setters. Additionally, our 2nd-order occasion setting models outperformed our congruent 1st-order occasion 
setting models (i.e., when controlling for number of α parameters). Thus, our 2nd-order occasion setting 
model was able to significantly predict direct learning, 1st-order occasion setting, and 2nd-order occasion 
setting. 
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 Integrating results from both experiments, the Rescorla-Wagner model accounted for 
approximately 0% of the variance in the data. Conversely, our 1st-order occasion setting models account 
for approximately 38% (General α) and 51-54% (Stimulus-Specific αs) of the data. Our best-fitting models 
were the 2nd-order occasion setting models; among those, the best-fitting models accounted for 
approximately 60-61% of variance. Additionally, WAIC results were congruent: all occasion setting models 
outperformed the Rescorla-Wagner model, and the 2nd-order occasion setting models outperformed the 1st-
order occasion setting models (controlling for number of α parameters). Overall, collapsing across both 
experiments, our Stimulus-Specific learning rate model performed the best, which provided a learning rate 
parameter for each stimulus combination (Experiment  1: WAIC = 29,431, R2 = .609, Experiment 2: WAIC 
= 30,994, R2 = .599). 
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Figure 5. Computational Modeling - Model Fit. Model fit and accuracy were determined with WAIC (lower = better) across all 
trials and R
2
 during Training/Reminder phases. Three models were compared: Rescorla-Wagner model (direct associations 
only), Zbozinek et al. 1st OS (direct associations and 1st-order occasion setting), and Zbozinek et al. 2nd OS (direct associations, 
1st-, and 2nd-order occasion setting). Within the occasion setting models, we tested one general α vs stimulus-specific αs. Bar 
graph for WAIC indicates mean and standard error. Bar graphs for R
2
 values indicate median (due to a few extreme outliers). 
Individual data points for R
2
 values are plotted. R
2
 values above 0 indicate variance explained by model; R
2
 values below 0 
indicate model performed worse than a constant model. Panel a is Experiment 1 (2nd-order negative occasion setting); panel 
b is Experiment 2 (2nd-order positive occasion setting). Results show that all occasion setting models outperform the Rescorla-
Wagner model in both experiments. Additionally, in Experiment 1 (panel a), both 2nd-order occasion setting models outperform 
the 1st-order occasion setting models (WAIC and R2) with highly similar results between both 2nd-order occasion setting models. 
In Experiment 2 (panel b), matching for α models, both 2nd-order occasion setting models outperform the 1st-order occasion 
setting models (WAIC and R2), and the 2nd-order occasion setting model with stimulus-specific αs outperforms the general α 
model. Integrating both experiments, the 2nd-order occasion setting model with stimulus-specific αs performs the best 
(Experiment 1: WAIC = 29,431, R2 = .609; Experiment 2: WAIC = 30,994, R2 = .599). 
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Discussion 
This report investigated whether lower-order stimulus ambiguity can cause higher-order Pavlovian 
learning to occur. This was assessed using an established Pavlovian paradigm that studies stimulus 
ambiguity: Pavlovian occasion setting (2,3,9). From a hierarchical modulation perspective, traditional 1st-
order occasion setting occurs when one stimulus (i.e., the 1st-order occasion setter) determines whether 
another stimulus (i.e., the conditional stimulus; CS) will result in a specific outcome (i.e., the unconditional 
stimulus; US). First-order occasion setting is a well-established area of research (2,3,9), but research on the 
existence of 2nd-order occasion setting is inconclusive and almost non-existent (18). We hypothesized that a 
stimulus (i.e., the 2nd-order occasion setter) determines how a 1st-order occasion setter affects the CS/US 
association only if the lower-order stimuli (i.e., CSs, 1st-order occasion setters) are ambiguous (i.e., when 
they only sometimes predict the US), not when they are unambiguous (i.e., when they always predict either 
the presence or absence of the US). This is highly relevant for real-life learning and decision-making, as 
associations between stimuli/contexts and their outcomes tend to be ambiguous (e.g., whether a public 
speech will be well-received usually depends on many factors). Our experiments are the first to investigate 
whether 2nd-order occasion setting exists by conducting tests of the underlying learning processes. The 
results of our experiments showed strong support for our hypotheses, including that participants used 2nd-
order occasion setting to learn about the reinforcement of ambiguous (but not unambiguous) lower-order 
stimuli (i.e., 1st-order occasion setters, CSs).  
First, we assessed whether a 1st-order occasion setter could affect an unambiguous CS. In three 
tests in Experiment 1, we replicated previous studies showing that a 1st-order positive occasion setter has 
greatly reduced ability to affect an unambiguous CS- (e.g., 16). In Experiment 2, one of three tests found 
congruent results that a 1st-order negative occasion setter has greatly reduced ability to affect responding to 
an unambiguous CS+ (e.g., 22). These less consistent results for 1st-order negative occasion setters likely 
stem from the relative difficulty of learning negative vs positive 1st-order occasion setting, which has been 
shown elsewhere (7,13,23) and in the present experiments. 
Second, one of our critical novel hypotheses was that a 2nd-order occasion setter would not affect 
unambiguous lower-order stimuli (i.e., 1st-order occasion setters, CSs) but would affect ambiguous lower-
order stimuli. This hypothesis was supported in both experiments for all analyses. Importantly, we tested 
the same 2nd-order occasion setter/1st-order occasion setter/CS stimulus arrangements – the only difference 
being the conditions of testing, which occurred while the 1st-order occasion setter/CS combination was 
unambiguous and later when ambiguous. This experimental manipulation allows us to causally determine 
that ambiguity increased the effects of the 2nd-order occasion setter on the lower-order 1st-order occasion 
setter/CS. 
However, this does not mean that ambiguity is the only determinant of higher-order learning, and 
we do not claim that it is. Rather, we claim that lower-order stimulus ambiguity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for 2nd-order occasion setting to occur and that other specific factors help determine 
which ambiguous stimuli will be affected by an occasion setter. One example of these specific factors is 
lower-order stimulus training history (16). For example, a CS+ that undergoes acquisition unambiguously 
predicts the US, but if it later undergoes extinction, it becomes ambiguous. However, studies show mixed 
results in the ability of a 1st-order occasion setter to affect responding to a trained/extinguished CS+ (16,24,25). 
In this example, during acquisition, the CS+ is unambiguously paired with the US, so its excitatory training 
does not involve a 1st-order positive occasion setter; after extinction, responding to the CS+ does not 
consistently increase when presented with a 1st-order positive occasion setter (despite the CS’s ambiguity) 
likely because the CS+ was never trained with a 1st-order positive occasion setter. As another example, 
when OS1A/CSB and OS1C/CSD are trained (where “OS1” is a 1st-order occasion setter and the subscript 
letters are stimuli), the OS1 from one training will affect the CS from another training (e.g., OS1A will 
affect CSD), but this effect ranges from being partial (16,26) to complete (27). A pure ambiguity perspective 
would predict the 1st-order occasion setters would completely transfer their effects to a separately trained 
ambiguous CS. One explanation for the inconsistency in results could be stimulus generalization, where 
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within-OS1 similarity and within-CS stimulus similarity could facilitate transfer (22) but dissimilarity could 
hinder it. Alternatively, the modulation account posits that 1st-order occasion setters affect the CS/US 
association itself (9), so when either the CS or US is changed, decrements in responding occur (28,29). This 
collective evidence could be interpreted as failures of the ambiguity hypothesis. More likely, they indicate 
other factors built upon ambiguity (e.g., training history, stimulus similarity) influence when ambiguity has 
an effect. Importantly, there are ample studies demonstrating that 1st-order occasion setters affect 
ambiguous CSs (16,26,27) but none that definitively show that they affect unambiguous CSs (the very few 
studies that do show this effect can be explained by less interesting phenomena, such as stimulus 
generalization or second-order conditioning; e.g., 30). Thus, it seems that ambiguity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for 2nd order occasion setting to occur. 
We are not the first to posit this ambiguity hypothesis (2,4–6,31) or to experimentally assess it (26). 
However, we are the first to extend it to 2nd-order occasion setting, investigate its robustness across learning 
hierarchies, and to create a theoretical and computational model operationalizing CS ambiguity and 1st-
order occasion setter ambiguity. The data from the present experiments supports our computational model 
and its unique aspect of operationalizing CS ambiguity (i.e., CS ambiguity = direct excitation * direct 
inhibition) and 1st-order occasion setter ambiguity (i.e., OS1 ambiguity = positive OS1 * negative OS1) as 
the gateway to higher-order learning. Additionally, in terms of both WAIC and R2, our 2nd-order occasion 
setting model outperformed our 1st-order occasion setting model, and both models greatly outperformed a 
direct associations model (i.e., Rescorla-Wagner). Thus, our model-free and model-based results 
converged, and both suggest that 2nd-order occasion setting, 1st-order occasion setting, and direct 
associations were learned. 
It should be noted that both configural and modulation theories can account for the results of our 
experiments. Modulation is thought to be a more accurate account of the learning underlying occasion 
setting, which is why we conceptually and computationally focus on the modulation perspective (9). 
However, there is much overlap in predicted behavior between the two theories (9). A primary method to 
distinguish configuration vs modulation is manipulating the specificity of the CS/US association (e.g., using 
multiple CSs and USs; 9). Since this was not the goal of the present study, our design cannot distinguish 
between these two theories. 
The present results provide numerous clinical implications across many disorders that are 
embedded with Pavlovian processes (e.g., anxiety, substance use). For example, individuals with anxiety 
disorders have deficits in working memory (32–34), and learning occasion setting is demanding of working 
memory – especially 2nd-order occasion setting. In addition to anxious individuals’ deficits in discriminating 
safety from danger with direct associations (35–37) and 1st-order occasion setting (7), perhaps anxious 
individuals have deficits in learning 2nd-order occasion setting partly due to working memory deficits. This 
may be further compounded by anxious individuals’ intolerance of uncertainty (38,39), of which there is 
relatively more when learning higher-order vs lower-order Pavlovian associations. Thus, anxious 
individuals may show relatively greater fear of 1st- and 2nd-order occasion setting than non-anxious 
individuals. Second, our model claims that 1st-order occasion setters can be ambiguous (as has been shown 
elsewhere; e.g., 13,21), and it argues that CS responding will be minimal if the CS has direct inhibition, is 
presented with 1st-order negative occasion setters, and is absent of 1st-order positive occasion setters. This 
is relevant for anxiety disorders, as conventional exposure therapy focuses primarily on direct CS extinction 
with some effort to increase 1st-order negative occasion setters via context variability (40), but there is no 
explicit emphasis on 1st-order positive occasion setter extinction. Extinction of 1st-order positive occasion 
setting has been demonstrated elsewhere (19,20,41), and, from our model’s perspective, a 2nd-order negative 
occasion setter is the stimulus/context which determines how the extinguished 1st-order positive occasion 
setter will affect the CS/US association. This may suggest that exposure therapists should not only 
encourage CS extinction, but 1st-order positive occasion setter extinction, as well – the latter of which will 
be under the influence of a 2nd-order negative occasion setter. 
One limitation of our experiments is that our sample was collected online, so an experimenter was 
not present to observe data collection. However, we included multiple data quality checks to ensure data 
validity (e.g., instructions quizzes), and others have shown validity of online data using the specific service 
14 
 
we used (i.e., Prolific; 42). Importantly, the data shows that participants learned the complex discriminations 
appropriately, providing empirical evidence that our data is valid. 
In conclusion, our experiments were the first to explicitly demonstrate the existence of 2nd-order 
occasion setting. We experimentally showed that lower-order stimulus ambiguity (i.e., conditional stimuli, 
1st-order occasion setters) was necessary for higher-order learning (i.e., 1st- and 2nd-order occasion setting) 
to occur, and we argue that this is true in most if not all cases. Additionally, our computational model 
showed validity in predicting direct associations, 1st-order occasion setting, and 2nd-order occasion setting. 
These experiments are important for drawing research attention to an additional layer of Pavlovian learning 
(2nd-order occasion setting), as well as informing the treatment of anxiety disorders and other Pavlovian-
based disorders (e.g., substance use).  
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Methods 
Participants 
 
 Prolific (42) was used to recruit and collect human participant data online (Experiment 1: final N = 
58; Experiment 2: final N = 67). Eligibility criteria included being age 18-65, healthy or corrected vision, 
United States residents, English fluent, no hearing difficulties, and a Prolific approval rating of ≥95%; 
participants were only allowed to participate in one of the experiments. Across both experiments, 
demographics information included gender (53.60% female, 45.60% male, 0.80% agender), age (mean = 
30.18, SD = 10.88, min = 18, max = 63), and ethnicity (10.40% Black or African-American, 8% 
Central/East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Korean), 4.80% Hispanic or Latin(x), 6.40% South Asian (e.g., 
Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan), 62.40% White, and 8% Multiracial). Participants were paid $19.42 in 
Experiment 1 and $19.06 in Experiment 2 for completing the study. This amount was achieved by US 
presentations at the end of reinforced trials, where each US was a $0.12 USD increase in payment (as well 
as $2.50 for completing questionnaires). This study was deemed exempt by the California Institute of 
Technology Institutional Review Board, and all participants provided informed consent prior to 
commencing the study. 
 Additionally, prior to data collection, we pre-registered each study (Experiment 1: 
https://osf.io/n2c6v, Experiment 2: https://osf.io/hxcfs). Based on our pre-registered exclusion criteria (i.e., 
automatic/invariant responding), we excluded one participant from each Experiment 1 and 2; also, an 
additional participant from Experiment 2 was excluded because of technical difficulties. 
 
Design 
 
 There were no between-subjects conditions; within-subjects conditions included stimuli with direct 
associations with the US (i.e., CSs), 1st-order occasion setters, and 2nd-order occasion setters. Experiment 1 
was a 2nd-order negative occasion setting design, which included 1st-order positive occasion setting and 2nd-
order negative occasion setting. Experiment 2 was a 2nd-order positive occasion setting design, which 
included 1st-order negative occasion setting and 2nd-order positive occasion setting. Thus, Experiments 1 
and 2 are mirror opposites of each other. Both experiments included CSs with direct associations with the 
US. Our dependent variable was US expectancy, measured at the end of every trial. 
 
Materials and Apparatus 
 
The Pavlovian conditioning procedure was programmed using PsychoPy 2020.1.3. All learning 
stimuli (CSs, 1st-order occasion setters, 2nd-order occasion setters) were 4sec audio or visual stimuli. When 
multiple stimuli were presented within the same trial, they were presented serially with a 4sec inter-stimulus 
interval (ISI) between them. Serial presentation (rather than simultaneous presentation) is critical in most 
cases to learn occasion setting rather than direct associations (45,46). The US was a 1.25sec audio/visual 
stimulus showing an image of a gold coin with “12¢” written on it, confetti surrounding it, and an audio 
cash register sound (i.e., “cha-ching!”). Inter-trial intervals (ITIs) were 1.25sec. ITIs and ISIs included a 
fixation cross, which was also displayed uninterrupted during audio stimuli. All trials ended with a US 
expectancy rating, which had no time constraint (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 (2nd-Order Negative Occasion Setting) Trial Design. Each colored box represents a trial type 
presented in the experiment. Gray boxes represent what was shown visually on screen. Inter-trial intervals (ITIs) and 
inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) included a gray screen with a fixation cross (“+”). Duration of each trial component is 
shown at top of each trial type. Rating slide is shown in abbreviated form, and visual analog scale was used to rate US 
Expectancy. Auditory stimuli are indicated below slides in horizontal auditory band (         ). Violin symbol indicates 
violin sound (      ), static screen indicates white noise (     ), and dollar sign indicates cash register sound (   ). None 
of the auditory symbols were shown on screen during the experiment. Black arrow pointing to the right (        ) for 
each trial type indicates chronological sequence during trials. All stimuli are counterbalanced across participants 
within stimulus category: G/H (Unambiguous CSs), C/K (Ambiguous CSs), B/J (1st-order occasion setters), and A/T 
(2nd-order occasion setters). All trial types for Experiment 1 are shown except TJR+, which is identical to ABR+, but 
T and J stimuli are substituted for A and B. Experiment 2 (2nd-order positive occasion setting) is a mirror image design 
of Experiment 1 in which all trial types reinforced in Experiment 1 were not reinforced in Experiment 2, and all trial 
types not reinforced in Experiment 1 were reinforced in Experiment 2. The only exceptions are G+ and H-, which 
remained a CS+ and CS-, respectively, in each study. 
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Unambiguous CSs (i.e., G+, H-) were images of fractals, ambiguous CSs (Experiment 1: C, K; 
Experiment 2: F, N) were images of a blue triangle and orange circle, OS1s (Experiment 1: B, J; Experiment 
2: E, M) were a violin sound and white noise sound, and OS2s (Experiment 1: A, T; Experiment 2: D, U) 
were images of a desert and forest. Within each category, stimuli were counterbalanced across participants. 
Using different stimulus modalities (e.g., auditory, visual) between hierarchical levels facilitates distinction 
between direct and OS learning (11). This is likely because different modalities help distinguish the occasion 
setter and CS in physical properties and in associative meaning. Given that we only had two modalities to 
use, we made the 2nd-order occasion setting level visual (to distinguish from 1st-order occasion setting) but 
categorically different from the CS images (i.e., context images vs shapes/fractals). An additional 
unambiguous CS (Experiment 1: R; Experiment 2: S) was an image of a three-dimensional white gem; this 
stimulus was used to facilitate 2nd-order occasion setting (see Supplemental Materials). Notably, the above 
list is the primary function of each stimulus, but a given stimulus may have had more than one hierarchical 
meaning. For instance, each “1st-order occasion setter” listed above was also a CS with a direct association 
with the US, and this was modulated by an “2nd-order occasion setter” listed above, which acted as a 1st-
order occasion setter in that case (e.g., Experiment 1: “B” was a 1st-order occasion setter (C-, BC-) but also 
a CS (B-, AB+); “A” was a 2nd-order occasion setter (ABC-) but also a 1st-order occasion setter (B-, AB-) 
and a CS (A+)). This allowed us to test the specific hierarchical functions of each stimulus and determine 
whether independence between hierarchical levels is learnable. Lastly, the following is a list of congruent 
stimuli between each Experiment (listed as Experiment 1/Experiment 2): A/D, B/E, C/F, J/M, K/N, R/S, 
T/U. G+ and H- were identical across both studies. 
 
US expectancy. Participants used a visual analog scale to rate, “How certain are you that you are 
about to receive a bonus payment?” The values ranged from 1 = “Certain No Bonus”, 3 = “Completely 
Uncertain,” and 5 = “Certain Yes Bonus.” The visual analog scale did not display numerical values, but it 
displayed the anchors mentioned above. US expectancy was measured at the end of every trial using the 
mouse to click on the scale with unlimited time to respond. 
  
Procedure 
 
 Participants attended one experimental session online lasting approximately 1 hour 45 minutes, 
where they provided informed consent, completed questionnaires, and completed the Pavlovian learning 
experiment. In the experiment (see Table 1), participants were informed, “Your goal in this experiment is 
to learn which sounds and images predict receiving bonus payments.” During Training and Reminder 
phases, participants experienced US (non)reinforcement, which resulted in learning and real increases in 
their payment. Importantly, to maintain the Pavlovian nature of the experiment (rather than instrumental), 
participant responses did not affect their payment. During Transfer Test, participants were not informed 
whether they received the US, which was accomplished by using an image of a curtain to cover the location 
on screen where the US image would otherwise occur and muting the US sound. This curtain/muted 
modification was done so that no learning and no reinforcement/non-reinforcement would occur during 
Transfer Test, allowing us to test the underlying learning processes that occurred during training with many 
Transfer Test trial types but without learning via the non(reinforcement) of the critical transfer test trials. 
In sum, Training was conducted for participants to learn which stimuli predict (non)reinforcement, and 
Transfer Test was conducted to investigate how participants learned which stimuli predict 
(non)reinforcement. 
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Data Analysis 
 
We used Stata 15.1 multilevel modeling for inferential statistics. For US expectancy and SCR 
during the Training phase, Level 1 predictors were Stimulus, Linear Slope (e.g., Trial Blocks 1-5), and 
Quadratic Slope (e.g., Trials Blocks 1-5). If the Quadratic Slope was not significant, it was removed from 
the model and re-run as a linear model. If the Linear Slope was not significant, it was removed and collapsed 
across Stimulus. For Transfer Test, the Level 1 predictor was Stimulus using the average of all three trials 
from a given block. For Transfer Test, we calculated difference scores between the relevant stimuli and 
conducted t-tests with those difference scores. 
 Furthermore, computational modeling was conducted using Python 3.7.6. We used computational 
modeling to evaluate our theoretical model’s fit with the data. In our models, the only free parameter was 
learning rate (i.e., α). In short, our model separately calculates direct excitation (i.e., “direct” meaning 
associations between a CS and US), direct inhibition, 1st-order positive occasion setting (i.e., where the OS1 
modulates the current CS/US association), 1st-order negative occasion setting, 2nd-order positive occasion 
setting (i.e., where the OS2 modulates the effect of OS1 on the CS/US association), and 2nd-order negative 
occasion setting. It then predicts behavioral responding by adding together direct excitation, 1st-order 
positive occasion setting, and 2nd-order positive occasion setting, and subtracting direct inhibition, 1st-order 
negative occasion setting, and 2nd-order negative occasion setting into the variable R (i.e., “responding”). 
Like the Rescorla-Wagner model (10), the normal bounds of learning/responding are -1 to 1, where R > 0 is 
excitation and R < 0 is inhibition. The Supplementary Materials provide details about the model. 
Additionally, we have included an html file in our Supplementary Materials (titled “Zbozinek et al 2nd-
Order Occasion Setting Formulas.html) that provides an interactive figure for readers to engage with. With 
this figure, readers can manipulate the variables of the model using sliding scales and view the output. We 
highly suggest the readers uses this file to better understand the model and formulas. 
  In our models, learning rate (α) is a free parameter. We ran one model at each hierarchical level: 
Rescorla-Wagner (direct associations only), our 1st-order occasion setting model (direct associations and 
1st-order occasion setting), and our 2nd-order occasion setting model (direct associations and 1st- and 2nd-
order occasion setting). The Rescorla-Wagner model had a general α (one α for all stimuli). Within our 
occasion setting models, we ran two different α models: General (one α for all stimuli) and Stimulus-
Specific (one α for each unique trained stimulus association; 15 total). For general model fitting, we allowed 
γ1 (i.e., CS ambiguity), γ2 (i.e., OS1 ambiguity), and λ̅ (i.e., absence of an expected US) to scale according 
to their formulas (see Supplemental Materials). The natural scaling of these variables slows down predicted 
learning since they are used in the trial-by-trial Δ formulas to predict change in learning. Thus, they inflate 
α values for the relevant stimuli (i.e., 1st- and 2nd-order occasion setters and inhibitory stimuli). For our 
primary analyses, we calculated γ1, γ2, and λ̅ according to their formulas. Secondarily, to obtain the most 
accurate α values, we ran separate models in which we fixed γ1, γ2, and λ̅ to 1, allowing all individual 
differences in learning rate across stimuli and participants to be funneled into α. 
All models were fit using a hierarchical Bayesian approach, assuming subject-level parameters 
were drawn from group-level distributions, with parameters estimated using variational inference 
implemented in PyMC3 with 40,000 iterations. To evaluate α parameter recovery, we separately simulated 
random α values ranging 0-1 and recovered them using our model with our sample size. In both, the 
correlation of simulated vs recovered α parameters in our best-fitting model was very high (rs > .998; see 
Supplementary Materials). Model comparison was performed using Watanabe-Akaike Information 
Criterion (WAIC) scores (47), which provides a goodness of fit measure for Bayesian models, penalizing 
for increasing numbers of free parameters in the model (lower scores indicate better model fit). We 
additionally estimated R2 values for training trials (which encompasses both Training and Reminder phases) 
using scikit, where the best score is 1, and negative scores indicate the model fitting arbitrarily worse than 
a constant model. Ultimately, we evaluated models based on WAIC scores, R2 values, and robustness across 
both experiments. 
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